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Copyright Registration
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All four winds together
Can 1 bring the world to me
Shadows hide the play of light
So much I want to see
Chase the light around the world
I want to look at ligM-ln the available light

-Neil Peart'
I. INTRODUCTION
Surprisingly, commentators have written very little on the proper scope
of copyright protection, or on the role of the copyright registration
application forrn2 in determining the scope of the copyright.3 In this
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2. In this Article, the term uapplication for registration" or minor variations
thereof refers to the particular application fonn that an applicant for copyright
registration completes and files with the Copyright Office (along with the requisite fee
and a deposit copy of the work). By contrast, the term "registration certificate" or
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Article, I address these issues. I believe these are some of the most
fundamental, unresolved issnes in copyright law; they will only become
more important in the future. For instance, the increasing frequency of
electronic digitization of works of authorship means that such works can
be readily fragmented and reassembled with components from other
works with astonishing ease to produce hybrid works, barely recognizable from their constituent works.4 In these instances, determining
whether the new work infringes upon a constituent work requires a
fundamental yet practical model to determine the scope of copyright
protection. As part of her prima facie case, a copyright plaintiff is
required to prove that the accused infringer had access to her copyrighted work.5 This prong of the infringement test is the source of considerable confusion.6 For instance, does "access" require that defendant have
had direct contact with plaintiff's work, or does it require only a
reasonable probability of access as evidenced, for example, by wide
dissemination of plaintiff's work. The analysis presented in this Article
,vill also significantly advance this debate. To accomplish these goals,
I focus exclusively on cases presenting section 411(a) disputes, which
are among the most frequently misdecided cases in copyright law.
Section 411 (a) of the Copyright Code requires that a copyright
plaintiff proffer a valid certificate of registration of copyright as a
condition of bringing suit for copyright infringement: At first glance,
this seems a simple enough requirement, yet in practice, it is often not.
The question that I am interested in is how courts interpret section
4ll(a); or more precisely, what is the judicially required congruence
between the certificate of registration and the work of authorship that the
plaintiff alleges was infringed. For instance, suppose the defendant
copied a derivative work, yet the plaintiff has only registered the

"certificate of registration" refers to the very same application once registration has been
granted. This is consonant with usage in the copyright literature. I apologize in advance
for any confusion.
3. There are a few other articles on this subject. See, e.g., John B, Koegel,
Bamboozlement: The Repeal of Copyright Registration Incentives, 13 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 529 (1995); Charles Ossola, Registration and Remedies: Recovery of
Attorney's Fees and Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Reform Act, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559 (1995).
4. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 30 (1994).
5. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[B]ecause direct evidence
of copying is rarely available, the plaintiff can rely upon circwnstantial evidence to
prove this essential element, and the most important component of this sort of
circwnstantial evidence is proof of access.").
6. Alan Latinan, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Towards
Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 41 l(a) (1996).
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underlying work. Will that registration satisfy section 411(a)? Recast
in a slightly more abstract form, the issue is simply how to determine
the scope of a copyright.
Section 4ll(a) is more than a jurisdictional predicate. If a court
determines that the work alleged to be infringed is not subsumed within
the scope of the certificate of registration proffered by the copyright
plaintiff, then the suit is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8 Wbile plaintiff can simply complete a new certificate of
registration covering the infringed work and subsequently refile suit, if
she is forced to do this she will probably forfeit the benefits that the
Code provides to early registrants (namely, statutory damages and
attorney fees under section 412).9 Further, since actual damages are
quite often difficult or impossible to prove, a section 4ll(a) dismissal
may, as a practical matter, mean a permanent bar to recovery. 10
II.

THE CLAIM/WORK/COPY TRICHOTOMY AND TIIB CORRECT
MEANING OF SECTION

A.

4ll(A)

The Meaning of the Terms Claim, Work. and Copy

The difficulty in properly defining the scope of a copyright is due in
some measure to the Code's apparently overlapping and therefore
partially redundant terms: "claim," 11 ''work," 12 and "copy."13 In this
section, I propose discrete definitions of these terms that are both
theoretically coherent and heuristically viable. Both "copy" and ''work"
are explicitly defined in the Code:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work

8. See id.; see also Shaw v. Lindhime, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1901 (C.D.
Cal. 1992) ("[S]ince plaintiff never registered the underlying treatment, a prerequisite to
bringing suit for copyright infringement in accord with 17 U.S.C. § 41l(a), he cannot

assert a claim or recover for infringement of protectable expression original to that
treatment.") (emphasis added).
9. 17 u.s.c. § 412 (1996).
I 0. Indeed, my review of a large, statistically significant sample of copyright
infringement cases reveals that copyright plaintiffs elect statutory damages over actual
damages (or the infringer's profits) approximately 95% of the time.
11. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1996).
12. 17 U.S.C. § IOI (1996).
13. Id.
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can be perceived . . . . The term "copies" includes the material object, other
than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
A work is "created" when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first
time ....

A work is ''fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment

in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise

communicated for a period of more than transitory duration . ... 14

By contrast, the term "claim" is not expressly defined, but rather
appears only in Chapter 4 of the Code, which deals with registration.
The most significant place in which it appears is section 411(a): "[N]o
action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted
until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title." 15
Disentangling these three terms is an unfortunate prerequisite to a
proper interpretation of section 411(a). Section 4ll(a) states that the
"claim" is the thing registered, but it is the "work" that is infringed.
Moreover, the definition of ''fixed" reproduced above, implies that a
work is intangible; that is, it can exist prior to fixation in a tangible
copy: "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord ... is sufficiently permanent .
16
• • •"
Yet the definition of "created" seems to suggest that a work
does not exist until it is fixed in a tangible copy. This, in turn, seems
at odds with the definition of "fixed."
Thus, a copy is a particular embodiment of a work. A work may
therefore be embodied in numerous different copies: Book, CD ROM,
movie script, motion picture film, etc.; yet, it is still the same work.
Thus, a copy is merely a particular embodiment of the set of expressions
(some protectable, others not) and ideas comprising the work. "Work"
is the generic term to describe all possible tangible embodiments of a
particular set of artistic elements. Simply stated, a work is what the
author created.
If a copy is a tangible (or "fixed") embodiment of a work, then what
is a claim? One answer is that, aside from section 4ll(a), the Code uses
the terms "work" and "claim" interchangeably. If so, it is an unfortunate
lingnistic choice. I do not think they are synonymous. To say that a
"work" is what is registered is a misnomer. Technically speaking, it is

14.

IS.
16.
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a "claim" that is registered and protected.17 Yet, (and this is of
profound significance to my review of the cases that I discuss in this
Article) a work is the thing infringed. On this point, the Code is not
vague. Section 106, which lists the exclusive rights granted to a
copyright owner, speaks in every case of a ''work." 18 Section 504(c)(2)
of the Code corroborates this meaning, in part. 19 That provision sets
the range of permissible statutory damage awards per work infringed.2°
While a copy is distinguished from a work by fixation, the relationship
between a copyright claim and a work is more complicated. A work is
both broader and narrower in breadth than its corresponding claim. The
best way to visualize a work is to imagine some tangible article, such as
a book, then imagine all the elements of the book (the theme, plot,
settings, events, characters, etc.) and the overall arrangement of those
elements abstracted from the book itself. Therefore, the same "work"
could be embodied in a film, cassette tape, etc. A copyright claim, by
contrast, consists of only those copyrightable-i.e., protectable and
original-elements of the work that the applicant expressly claims in the
registration form. Hence, the copyright claim is much narrower than the
work.21 For instance, from·among the elements recited above, the title
may be per se unprotectable, the theme unprotectable because it is an
"idea" and the setting unprotectable because it is a public domain
element. So, a claim is less than the work. On the other band, a claim
is much broader than the work because it has a scope, or a zone of
protectability that surrounds each claimed element. Thus, an infringer

17. Id. "'Registration'... means a registration ofa claim ...." Id.
18. 17 u.s.c. § 106 (1996).
19. I say "in part'' because my impression, though vague, is that the definition of
"work" contemplated by the drafters of this provision, is different than elsewhere in the
Code, and also incongruent with the definition that I offer in this Article. For instance,
as I have defined the tenn ''work," each edition of a novel, differing from the original
by the author's slight variations, would still be the same "work." Yet, I suspect that for
§ 504(c)(2) purposes, many courts would view each edition as a different work. See 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1996).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
2 I. These definitions are consistent with the general test for copyright infringement While § I 06A states that a work is the thing infringed, an accused infringer has
the opportunity to show that she did not copy protectable elements from the work that
she infringed (i.e., she just took the names from a directory copyrighted as a compilation) and by doing so escape liability for infringement What the infringer is really
doing is proving that, while she may have copied parts of the work, she did not infringe
the claim.
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need not copy a protectable element verbatim; he infringes if his efforts
are "substantially similar" to the claimed element.
Still, my definitions do not seem entirely satisfying. Logically, it
would seem that a "claim" is what is infringed. Indeed, since a claim
is the sum of the protectable elements, how can one infringe anything
other than the protectable elements? Put another way, infringement
occurs only when a protected element is copied from the work. I cannot
account for why the Copyright Code is not more clear on this point.22
Perhaps section I 06A should be phrased in terms of the "claim" rather
than the "work." But I think "claim" is too awkward, too abstract. For
instance, in a compilation, the "claim" is the unique selection, coordination, and arrangement of the underlying data. Yet even the most subtle
minds would have difficulty visualizing a compilation minus its
unprotectable material. A ''work" is not a tangible article, but it is
certainly more real than a "claim." Perhaps the following is a useful
heuristic: A work is a generic term for a related set of expressions, both
protectable and unprotectable. The subset of protectable expressions
comprises the "claim." Finally, a "copy'' is one of many particular
physical forms in which a work may be embodied. In other words, the
work may be The Fountainhead23 because that is the thing the author
created, but the term "Fountainhead" is a generic term used to describe
several species-a book, a screenplay, and a dramatic performance
captured on film-that are all comprised of a common set of expressions,
e.g., the title, The Fountainhead.
Moreover, unlike patents, copyright claims frequently overlap, which
further frustrates concise definitions of the terms claim, work, and copy.
As discussed in the preceding paragraph, a work may comprise several
embodiments (e.g., a novel, a screenplay, and so forth). The owner of
the registered copyright in the novel could sue another for preparing an
unauthorized screenplay based on the novel. The registration of the
novel traverses the section 4ll(a) requirement and permits an action for
infringement by the screenplay. Yet, the screenplay is separately
registerable. If it were separately registered it would be considered a
different work than the novel because it emanates from a different
copyright claim.

22. Actually, the Patent Code is just as vague. The provision on infringement
states rather laconicly: "[W]boever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention ... infringes the patent" 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1996). Yet any competent

patent practitioner knows that infringement of a patent occurs when an accused device
reads onto each element ofa claim. See, e.g., Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
23. AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1968).
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In copyright law, the core concept is the "work." It lies between the
perplexingly ethereal "claim" and the purely concrete "copy." Unlike
patent law, the simplest way to describe a copyright claim is by
reference to a copy of the work (a particular tangible expression). What
is more, fixation in a particular copy is the sine qua non of copyright.24
That is, while a work may "exist'' in the creator's mind, it is not
protected by copyright until it is fixed in a copy. Indeed, the deposit
copy that must accompany each registration is certainly the best means
to inform the user of the nature and scope of the copyright claim. That
does not mean that copyright protection is limited to verbatim copyright
of that work. Rather, the work specified in the registration (under "Title
of This Work") and deposited with the copyright office is something like
the work's center of gravity (and the claim's as well) from which an
infinite number of inchoate similarly protectable embodiments emanate.
Indeed, if the drafters of section 411 had wanted to require registration
of a particular work as a condition of filing suit, they could have said so
simply by substituting the term "work" for "claim."
Under the Patent Code, a patent plaintiff need not point to any
particular embodiment of her patent's claims copied by defendant.
Rather, she need only prove that the accused device is captured within
the scope of the claims of her patent. Contrast this with copyright law:
A copyright plaintiff proves her prima facie case by showing that she
owns the copyright and that the defendant copied a work subsumed
within the copyright.25 Copying, in turn, may be proved either by
direct evidence of copying or inferentially by proof of access and
substantial similarity between the two works.26 Hence, infringement is
tied to copying a work, not a claim. This disparity between patent law
and copyright law exists because in the latter, independent creation
absolves the defendant of liability for infringement. Thus, copyright law
requires the plaintiff to proffer a fixed embodiment of the work (a
"copy'') and assert that the defendant copied from it in order to prove
liability.

24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996).
25. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,548
(1985); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir.
1977).
26. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986).
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Again though, what is infringed is the "work"; this should never be
confused with a "copy." An important corollary derived from this
principle is that the work copied by the infringer does not have to be a
copy created by the plaintiff. For instance, suppose the infringer extracts
a table of facts from a work produced by a third party. Further, suppose
that the table was originally a small part of a much larger work that the
third party borrowed from the plaintiff, who had duly registered this
work. Further, although this may not always be true, suppose that the
table of facts appearing in the third party's work was an independently
protected element of the work registered by the plaintiff. Hence, the
plaintiff would prove copying by proving that the defendant had access
to a protected element of its registered claim through a copy of her work
prepared by a third party that incorporated the protected element.
The Copyright Code relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving
actual harm (or defendant's unlawful gain) and gives her the option to
elect "statutory damages," provided she complies with certain administrative minutiae.27 Statutory damages range from $200 to $100,000 per
work infringed by defendant.
Additionally, I do not intend to say that an applicant must expressly
recite in the copyright application all copyrightable elements of her work
in order to render them protectable under that registration. Yet, in one
form or another, I argue that the applicant must claim every protectable
element or forfeit the privilege of enforcing infringement of that element.
For instance, an applicant may state in section 2(b) of Form TX under
''Nature of Authorship," that she is the author of the "entire text"; then,
state in section 6(b) that she is registering a compilation. What has she
claimed? She has claimed the underlying textual material and its unique
selection, coordination, and arrangement as a compilation. Another
example: In a work of fiction, the applicant recites "entire text" in
section 2(b). What elements are claimed? Provided they are copyrightable, she has claimed the literal text, characters, plot, setting, etc.; that
is, claiming authorship of the text subsumes the elements that can be
abstracted from it, regardless of the form in which they are embodied.
That embodiment can take the form of a narrative, screenplay, film, etc.
Unfortunately, there is no case law which offers discrete definitions of
these terms. Yet in a few instances, courts have been forced to define
the term "work" for the purpose of determining whether several physical
articles comprised a single work or more than one. The results in these
cases are more or less consistent with the analysis presented above. For
instance, in MCA Television, the court held that separate episodes of a

27.
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television program are separate works (as opposed to a single series
comprising a single work).28 The Second Circuit in Twin Peaks
Productions reached a virtually identical result.29 In these cases, and
most others, "work" is defined as follows: "[S]eparate copyrights are
not distinct 'works' unless they can 'live their own copyright life.' This
test focuses on whether each expression has an independent economic
value and is, in itself, viable."30

B.

The Meaning of Section 411 (a)

Section 411 of the Copyright Code requires a valid registration as a
prerequisite to bringing suit: "[N]o action for infringement of the
copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title."31
What does this mean? Two interpretations are possible. One is:
"You cannot sue until you submit a completed certificate of registration
that encompasses within its scope the work(s) that you allege the
defendant copied."32 The other is: "You cannot sue until you submit
a completed registration specifically listing by title the work(s) that you
allege the defendant copied." According to the language of section 411,
and in light of my review of the terms copy, work, and claim, the former
interpretation is best. Juxtaposition of the terms "work" and "claim" in
section 411 is the best evidence of this. Section 4ll(a) says that a work
is the thing infringed, but a claim is what one registers. Thus, numerous
versions of a work will be subsumed under a single claim, provided that
each version can be comprised of one or more protectable elements
claimed in the registration certificate. The Code would have said that
a copy is what is registered, or even a work, but it did not-it said

"claim."
What is the significance of this? Well, if I am correct, then a
copyright plaintiff should not be required in her pleadings to specify the

28. MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1586, 1588 (I Ith Cir. 1996).
29. Twin Peaks Production, Inc. v. Publications Int'!, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1381
(2d Cir. 1993).
30. MCA Television Ltd., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (citations omitted) (citing
Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ban-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1996).
32. The certificate of registration must be accompanied by requisite fees and
deposit copies.
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precise copy (i.e., by description in the registration application or by
deposit of the precise copy) that was infringed. Instead, section 41 l(a)
requires that she register a claim which subsumes the copied work within
the scope of that claim. The copied work is subsumed within the scope
of that claim if the accused work contains protectable elements claimed
in the registration certificate. Finally, the plaintiff must allege that
defendant copied one or more of the claimed elements from a particular
copy embodying one or more claimed elements. An example: Plaintiff
registers a claim by properly completing a Form TX. The article listed
in the title line of the form and deposited with the copyright office
contains a "Table A," which is a tabular presentation of some of the
information contained in the work. As an original work of authorship,
it is an independently protectable element of the work. Thus, it
comprises part of the claim. Next, plaintiff authors another work that
also contains Table A, but fails to register the second work. Defendant
then copies portions of the second work, including Table A. Under this
scenario, defendant has infringed the first work (and perhaps the second).
Hence, the original registration will suffice to support a suit for
infringement of the second work. This example answers the question of
whether registration of an underlying work alone will suffice to bring
suit for copying a derivative work. The answer is clear: One who
copies protected elements of a registered copyright claim infringes that
claim, regardless of the particular work, or copy of that work, from
which those elements were copied. Put more simply, how one infringes,
i.e., from which of the copyright owner's works they chose to copy the
protected elements, is irrelevant to the determination of whether the
accused copy possesses elements comprising the copyright claim.
To summarize: In a proper section 4ll(a) analysis, the work, and
especially any copies of that work, remain in the background; the claim
is the focus of the inquiry. Therefore, under my standard, the issue is
not framed as: "Does this registration satisfy section 41 l(a), even
though the infringer copied a subsequent version of the work?" Instead,
it's framed as: "Did the infringer copy elements from the claim set forth
in that registration?"
Perhaps this seems unfair. According to my rule, one who copies the
smallest protectable element in a claim infringes that claim. This is true
even if the copy from which the infringer copied is completely different
(except for the single element) from the copy deposited upon registration. Unlawful copying of even a small but substantial portion of a
copyright owner's work (whether in relation to the infringer's work as
a whole, or in relation to the infringed work) has always been an
infringement: "[I]t is enough that substantial parts were lifted; no
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he
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did not pirate."33 Hence, it is immaterial toward liability that an
infringer infringed only a small portion of the copyright owner's claim.
However, the infringer still may have a fair use defense.34 Further, the
fact that only a small portion was infringed can be asserted to mitigate
actual or statutory damages.
C.

The Purpose Behind Section 4ll(a)

The purpose of section 411(a) is essentially to facilitate judicial
resolution of the ownership issue--the first of two elements in a prima
facie case of copyright infringement. To accomplish this, section 4ll(a)
operates in concert with sections 410(c) and 412.35 Section 410(c)
quite generously gives the plaintiff-registrant the benefit of a presumption of ownership if she proffers a valid registration covering the
elements alleged to have been infringed.3 6 That is, section 410(c) turns
a valid certificate of registration into a prima facie case of ownership of
the copyright claimed. Section 412, on the other hand, compels early
registration (and hence more accurate recitation of the claim) by making
available to the registrant statutory damages and attorney fees. 37
The logical precondition to the section 410(c) presumption is that the
registrant actually claims the work (or the elements) that she alleges to
be infringed. Otherwise, the court must conduct an ab initio investigation into the ownership of the accused element--the very situation
sections 410(c), 411(a), and 412, together, were crafted to prevent.
Finally, what is the consequence of a section 4ll(a) dismissal? It is
much more than a proforma ruling that would serve no purpose other
than to force the plaintiff to register the omitted element and re-file suit.
Dismissal on section 4ll(a) grounds, which is a ruling that the accused
element is not covered by the proffered registration certificate, forces the
plaintiff to separately register the accused element. The likely consequence of this is that the plaintiff forfeits the availability of statutory
damages and attorney fees. What is more, actual damages are often

33. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).
Professor Nimmer agrees. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[B][l][a], 13-57 (1996).
34. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1996).
35. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 410(c), 412 (1996).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 412(c).
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difficult or impossible to prove, and even if they could be proved, they
would be negligible. Hence, statutory damages coupled with attorney
fees (which will in practice often overwhelm the statutory damages
award) is very often the only viable remedy.

ill. REVIEW OF TIIB CASE LAW AND PRESENTATION AND
APPLICATION OF A NEW MODEL FOR RESOLVING SECTION 4ll(A)
DISPUTES
A. Introductory Remarks
I have organized the cases according to the problems they present.
My review of the case law blends both normative and positive elements:
I am interested both in what the law is, and in what it should be. In
each section, I state the majority position if I can identify one. Though
many of the cases arrive at the correct result, I have generally found the
rationale offered to support the result to be unsatisfactory---hence the
normative analysis. In this section, I also apply my model, set forth in
the preceding sections, on how courts should interpret section 4ll(a) and
also on how certificates ofregistration for copyright should be interpret•
ed. Additionally, intertwined with my discussion of the case law, I
provide additional justification for the approach that I present.

B. Scenarios: 1) Plaintiff Registers the Underlying Work and the
Infringer Then Copies a Derivative Work. 2) Plaintiff Registers a
Work in One Medium ofExpression and the Infringer Then Copies
the Work in a Different Medium 38
The case law on this question is too disperse to reveal a majority
position or even for me to identify meaningful trends. I begin with a
group of cases involving an accused infringer who copied the plaintiff's
work fixed in a different medium than the plaintiff's work was originally
fixed at the time of registration.
In general, courts tend to permit a copyright plaintiff to satisfy section
41l(a)'s strictures by proffering a registration that specified a work fixed
in one medium, though she alleges infringement of a work fixed in a

38. I am not concerned with the scenario inwhich the defendant copies plaintiff's
work in a different medium, i.e., where the defendant herself creates the derivative work,

Indeed, preparation of the derivative work is a separate act of infringement as evidenced
by § 106(2) of the Copyright Code. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1996). Instead, my
concern is the more interesting problem where defendant copies a derivative work that
the plaintiff herself prepared, but did not register because she had already registered the
underlying work.
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different medium.39 This is as it should be. Indeed, the correct
solution follows virtually axiomatically from the definitions of "work''
and "claim" that I recited earlier in this Article. Recall that the claim is
the thing registered and that the work is what the author created (i.e., the
entire corpus of artistic elements-both protectable and otherwise-which exists without regard to fixation in any particular medium
of expression). In other words, a work is a generic term covering all
possible media of expression, or means of fixation. Therefore, a
certificate of registration specifying "scripts for a radio broadcast'' will
satisfy section 4ll(a) and permit the registrant to sue an infringer who
copied tape recordings of those scripts that the plaintiff later produced
but did not separately register. Once more, this is so because, according
to the Copyright Code, a "work" is the thing infringed, and a work is
not fixed in any particular medium of expression.40 Moreover, it makes
no difference that the registrant specified "scripts" in her certificate of
registration; what she registered is a claim. Specifying a particular copy
that embodies those elements does not limit the claim. Indeed, fixation
(i.e., producing a copy) is a requirement for copyrightability. Hence, for
registration purposes, a registrant must necessarily specify a particular
copy of the work to prove fixation. Therefore, the proper concept is that
the infringer copied the "work" through access to the taped performances.41

Second, while courts recognize that a single registration certificate
subsumes numerous different media of expression, even though the
applicant specified only a single medium (for example, a written script),
it seems that courts tend to over-fixate on the article deposited with the
Copyright Office with the application. I agree that this "copy," when
examined in light of the certificate of registration, is the best way to
inform a subsequent user/author of the scope of the copyright claim.
Still, the deposit copy does not, per se, define the claim. The article

39. E.g., Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Cmp., 740 F.2d 718 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that copying plaintiff's tape-recorded perfonnances of the
copyrighted scripts infringed the scripts); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) I (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that TV dramatization of a copyrighted script

is a derivative work).
40. However, a work is not protected by copyright until it is fixed in at least one
tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996).

41. This proposition seems consistent with current orthodoxy, although there is no
case Jaw to support it at this time.
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deposited is sim,P,lY a "copy," that is, one of many possible embodiments
of the ''work.' 2 Indeed, at least some courts recognize that the
deposited copy is not the copyright claim: "[T]he materials deposited
with the Copyright Office 'do not define the substantive protection
extended to the registered work. ""3
Another frequently encountered problem, under this general rubric,
occurs when plaintiff alleges that defendant copied a version of
plaintiff's work created subsequent to plaintiff's registration. Once
again, the correct analysis is based on determining precisely what the
defendant copied. If the defendant copied only elements contained in
the subsequent version, then he did not infringe the work corresponding
to the claim in the registration. Consequently, a section 411(a) dismissal
is proper. On the other hand, if the defendant copied elements of the
claim set forth in the original registration, then the registration corresponding to the original version will support an infringement action for
copying the subsequent version. The lesson is clear: The plaintiff
should avoid asserting in the complaint that defendant simply infringed
a particular copy of a work, then proffering a registration alleging that
the registration covers the copy that was infringed. By this needless
focus on the "copy" or the physical article, the plaintiff invites the
defendant to scrutinize the registration and the deposit copy and compare
them with the copy which defendant actually infringed. Many section
4ll(a) disputes are like this. Instead-and much simpler-the plaintiff
should allege that defendant infringed work X (the original version) by
copying a subsequent version of work X because that subsequent version
contains protectable elements of work X that comprise a portion of the
copyright claim set forth in the proffered registration certificate.
Whether the alleged infringer copied the protected elements from one
version or another is entirely irrelevant.
As discussed above, most courts seem to understand and correctly
apply the principle that a copyrighted work is not limited to a particular
tangible embodiment. Yet there are numerous exceptions. Novak v.

42. For cases stating that depositing additional material does not automatically
expand the scope of the copyright claim, see National Conference of Bar Examiners v.
Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d 478,487 (7th Cir. 1982); Jefferson Airplane v.
Berkley Systems Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1632, 1635 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
43. Jungle Rags Inc. v. Rainbow Graphics Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1709
(N.D. Fla. 1993) ( quoting Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 1993
WL 153739 (D. Mass. 1993)). See also, Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brecher & Co.,
Inc., 411 F. Supp. 382, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the copyright covers the
deposited edition of the work and all further copies of it, even if those copies differ in
inconsequential detail from the originally deposited work).
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National Broadcasting Co. Inc. 44 is one such exception. In Novak,
plaintiffs Novak and Studer alleged that NBC infringed their "scripts"
portraying various comedic characters.45 Novak and Studer submitted
a number of videotapes to NBC; these videotapes were recorded performances of plaintiffs' scripts.46 Sometime later, NBC aired several skits
as part of the broadcast of the venerable "Saturday Night Live."47
Plaintiffs filed suit for copyright infringement alleging that these
performances infringed its scripts.48
I have said it before and I will say it again: A copy of a work is not
the thing infringed, it is the work that is infringed. Yet that is how
plaintiffs--who by the way, very unwisely chose to represent themselves--pled their infringement case. Still, the court should have
corrected this pleading error on its own. In any event, the court
dismissed most of the infringement claims on the astonishing ground that
the registrations only covered the scripts and not the performances:
However, Novak registered only the scripts ... and not the perfonnances of
such sketches. On this record, there has been no finding that Novak has any
copyright covering such sketches or that Novak has any ownership interest in
the perfonnances.
. • . Thus, the registration of the copyright for the performance is an absolute
prerequisite to the institution of an infringement suit alleging that the copyrights
in such performances have been infringed. 49

As if that weren't bad enough: "[I]t is the scripts that were copyrighted
and it is the scripts that must be infringed for Novak and Studer to
recover . . . .nSO

By now it should be quite clear that this is a grossly misconceived
approach. Of course, scripts are not the thing infringed. What is
infringed is the "work;" the scripts are merely one particular embodiment
of the work. Nor are scripts "registered," rather what is registered is a
claim, which again, consists of the copyrightable elements of the work.
My guess is that plaintiffs' registrations--! suppose since they represented themselves in court they also filled out the certificates of registration

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.

12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
at 1261-64.
at 1260.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1264.
at 1265.
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themselves--specified "scripts," and what was deposited was, again, the
scripts.51
A second interesting issue raised by Novak is: What significance
should a court give the applicant's choice of registration form? For
instance, suppose Novak and Studer had registered their scripts using
Form TX (for textual works) rather than Form PA (for performing arts,
which they did use). If they had used Form TX, would the court's
decision that the registration only covered the scripts and not the
performances have been correct? Put more simply, does the choice of
registration form affect the scope of the copyright claim? The correct
answer is "no." The Copyright Code is fairly direct on this point: "This
administrative classification of works has no significance with respect to
the subject matter of copyright or the exclusive rights provided by this
title.',,,
In this Article, I argue (ad nauseam and perhaps beyond) that it is a
claim that is registered, and that a claim is simply all of the copyrightable elements contained in the applicant's work, and further, each of said
elements has a scope that extends beyond a single literal embodiment.
Failure to properly comprehend the nature of a copyright claim as
distinct from a work and further as distinct from a tangible copy, will
quite often lead a court to reach an erroneous result. For example, in
Offbeat Inc. v. Cager 3 the plaintiff, Offbeat, had previously registered
a "Louisiana Music Directory" (LMD), which consisted of the names
and "other pertinent information" on over 1,500 businesses and
individuals involved in the state and national music industry.54 What
the LMD did not contain were the mailing addresses of the listed
musicians, since Offbeat considered this information to be a trade
secret.55 The LMD arranged the information into over 100 categories.'6 As expected, the LMD was registered as a compilation.''
Defendant Cager copied mailing labels generated from a computerized
database owned by Offbeat that contained the information contained in
the LMD plus the trade secret information.58 The mailing labels

51.

Interestingly, Novak and Studer used fonu PA (for perfonuing arts) rather than

TX (for textual works), hence this should have signaled the judge that their "claim" was

broader than the scripts. See id. at 1261.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(I) (1996); see also, I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33,
§ 2.03[C], 2-33.
53. 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565 (B.D. La. 1994).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
51. Id. at 1567.
58. Id.
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contained the names and addresses of individuals and entities that had
previously been entered into the LMD. When sued for infringement,
Cager argued first that the mailing labels were generated from the
database, not the LMD, and since it was the LMD that was registered
and not the database, Offbeat's suit should be dismissed on section
4l!(a) grounds. Moreover, Cager argued, the information it copied from
the database, i.e., the musician's mailing addresses, are not even found
in the registered work.59 The court fixated on this last point in
justifying its holding:
[T]he registration of a substantial part of the database is only relevant if
plaintiff alleges that the part defendant copied was included in the registration.
. . . Since the LMD was the only 11tangible expression" of information that was
registered for copyright, plaintiff bas failed to state a claim for copyright

infringement60

This passage reveals that the court completely misunderstood both the
scope and definition of a copyright claim. The claim registered in this
instance was the "compilation." That means the protectable elements are
the unique selection, coordination, and arrangement of the data, not the
underlying data themselves. This claim must have at least included the
selection (unless it was exhaustive) of persons and businesses for
inclusion in the LMD. That same selection was embodied in the
database. The fact that the database contained different information
under each person and business should not have decided whether
elements comprising plaintiff's copyright claim were embodied in the
database. Again, this is because the claim does not cover the underlying
data, but something else altogether. The database appears to be just
another tangible expression of the work, the hard copy directory being
another. They are not identical, but that does not always matter. If the
two expressions share common elements of the copyright claim, they are
copies of the same work, as appears to be the case in Cager. By now
it should be quite clear that the Cager Court somehow thought the
underlying data (e.g., business names, addresses, etc.) were the
protectable elements. They were not. What was protected by the
copyright was the compilation-the unique selection, coordination, and
arrangement of those data. Hence, instead of comparing the LMD with
the database to determine similarity as to the underlying data, the Court
59. Id.
60. Id.
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should have compared the database's selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the data with that of the LMD to determine whether the
former was within the scope of plaintiff's copyright claim.

Scenario: Plaintiff Registers a Derivative Work and the Infringer
Copies the Underlying Work Which Has Not Been Registered

C.

This is the reciprocal problem to the one discussed in the previous
section. My review of the case law again reveals that courts tend to
permit a copyright plaintiff to traverse section 4ll(a)'s strictures in those
instances where she has registered the derivative work, but the infringer
copies an underlying element,provided that the plaintiff is the copyright
owner of the underlying material. 61 My colloquy under this section
revolves around Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai Inc. 62
Altai is particularly worthy of discussion because the reasoning behind
the holding is perhaps the most forceful challenge to my model for
interpreting the scope of a copyright claim. In addition, Altai is a key
case because the subject matter is computer software, an area which
presents some of the most challenging problems in determining the scope
of a copyright claim.
In Altai the defendant, Altai, copied a computer program known as
ADAPTER, which is part of a larger program, SCHEDULER.63 The
copyrights to both of these programs are owned by plaintiff, Computer
Associates Inc. (CA).64 The registration that CA proffered to support
its charge of infringement corresponded to SCHEDULER 2.1, a
derivative work (registered as such) of SCHEDULER 1.0.65 SCHEDULER 1.0, which was the original version to contain ADAPTER, was
never registered.66 Hence, ADAPTER was not new material added to
the preexisting work, rather it was material contained in the preexisting
work. Altai quite correctly argued that the suit should be dismissed on
section 411 (a) grounds because CA neverregistered the alleged infringed

61. See, e.g., Williams Products, Inc. v. Construction Gaskets, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 622 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Systems, Inc., 379 F.
Supp. I 190 (D. Del. 1974). But see, e.g., Cramer v. Crestar Fin. Coip., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1684 (4th Cir. 1995); Werbungs und Commerz Union Austalt v. LeShufy, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (S.D.N. Y. 1987). As I mentioned in the text, the different
results between these two sets of cases can be explained by the fact that in the former,

the plaintiff was the owner of the underlying material, in the latter he was not.
62.
63.

64.
65.

20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
Ed. at I 641-42.
ld.
Id. at 1647.

66.

Id.
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element, i.e., ADAPTER.67 The court declined to dismiss the suit on
the ground that CA was the owner of the copyright in ADAPTER (i.e.,
CA was the author, it was protectable subject matter, and it had not been
placed in the public domain).68
Contrary to what the Altai Court believed, section 103(b)69 (which
specifically discusses the scope of copyright in a derivative work) does
not resolve the dispute in CNs favor. Section 103(b) says only that the
copyright in a derivative work includes only the new material added to
the preexisting work:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material • . . • The copyright in such work is independent of, and

does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any
copyright protection in the preexisting material.70

This provision can be read, although erroneously so, to support the
court's ruling: CA is the author of ADAPTER, therefore CNs copyright
in the compilation also covers ADAPTER because ADAPTER is
"material contributed by the author."71 Yet the next three words
modify this phrase, "material contributed by the author ofsuch work."12
The term "such work'' refers to the derivative work and not to the
preexisting work. Hence, section 103(b) is not a directive to the court
to conduct an investigation into the ownership of the preexisting
material, as the Altai Court apparently thought. Indeed, if this were true,
it would squarely conflict with other sections of the Code. For instance,
section 411(a) is designed to facilitate judicial resolution of the
ownership issue (the first prong in a prima facie case of copyright
infringement) through section 410(c), which generously gives the
plaintiff-registrant the benefit of a presumption of ownership if he
proffers a valid registration covering the elements alleged to be
infringed.73

61.
68.
69.
70.

11.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1647-48.
17

Id.
Id.
Id.

u.s.c. § !03(b) {1996).

See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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As already mentioned, the Altai Court resolved the case based on the
fact that CA was the owner of the copyright in the accused element
(ADAPTER):
If there were evidence that the ADAPTER code bad been placed in the public
domain, or were owned by someone other than CA, Altai's argument that the
derivative nature of the registration did not extend to the ADAPTER code

would be compelling. However, there is no such evidence. On the contrary,
the undisputed evidence establishes that ADAPTER was developed by CA
originally for CAO. . • . In short, CA is the author of the ADAPTER program

and its "copyright protection" subsists without regard to registration.7

This is outrageous.75 Once again, section 410(c) turns a valid certificate of registration into aprimafacie case of ownership of the copyright
claimed. Further, sections 4ll(a) and 412 are designed to ensure that
copyright plaintiffs avail themselves of this presumption by making
registration a prerequisite to filing suit such that courts are relieved of
the burden of determining ownership of the copyright-in-suit, and by
compelling early registration by denying statutory damages and attorney
fees to a late registrant.
With this in mind, why permit a copyright plaintiff to maintain suit on
alleged infringed elements that she did not claim in the proffered
registration? Again, section 4ll(a) exists to expedite copyright litigation
by streamlining the ownership issue; it operates through section 410(c),
which gives a registrant a rebuttable presumption of ownership. The
implicit, and indeed obvious, precondition to this presumption is that the
registrant actually claims the work (or the elements) that she alleges to
be infringed. In Altai, the plaintiff CA did not do this and everyone
involved knew it. That's why the court had to conduct an ab inilio
investigation into the ownership of the accused element-the very
situation sections 410(c), 4ll(a), and 412, together, were crafted to
prevent.

74. Computer Assocs. Int'! Inc. v. Altai Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted). Although not mentioned in the Altai opinion, the
Compendium of Copyright Office Practices does seem to countenance the type of
omission of which CA was guilty. COPYRIGHT OmcE, COMPENDIUM II, COMPENDIUM
OF COPYRIGHT OmcE PRACITCES (1984). The Compendium provides that no statement
is required in section 6(b) of the application form unless a substantial amount of the
material incorporated in the derivative work is in the public domain or has been
registered or published previously. COPYRIGHT OmCE, supra, § 325.01. In my view,
this statement conflicts squarely with §§ 410(c), 4ll(a), and 412 of the Code for the
reasons that I have set out in this Article.
75. The Altai decision also squarely contradicts the Compendium of Copyright

Office Procedures: "Registration for a derivative computer program covers only the
additions, changes, or other new material appearing in the program for the first time."
COPYRIGHT OmcE, supra note 74, § 323.0 I.
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Cases like Altai convince me that courts really do not take section
411 (a) seriously. What is the consequence of a section 411 (a) dismissal?
The Altai Court believes that a dismissal on this ground would simply
be a hyper-technical ruling that would serve no purpose other than to
force the plaintiff to register the omitted element and re-file suit: "A
formalistic dismissal, followed by a re-registration and commencement
of a new action, is unnecessary and would be wasteful."76 As evidenced from the text of the opinion, CA in fact registered the accused
element, ADAPTER, subsequent to filing suit.77 Therefore, why did
CA contest Altai's argument that ADAPTER was not covered by the
registration of SCHEDULER 2.1? The only reason that seems to make
sense is that CA knew that if ADAPTER were not covered by the
SCHEDULER 2.1 registration certificate, it would forfeit statutory
damages and attorney fees as per section 412. Therefore, dismissal on
section 4ll(a) grounds, which is a ruling that ADAPTER is not covered
by the SCHEDULER 2.1 registration certificate, would force CA to
register ADAPTER separately and forfeit statutory damages and attorney
fees. Moreover, actual damages are often difficult or impossible to
prove, or even if they could be proved, they would be negligible.
Hence, statutory damages coupled with attorney fees78 is very often the
only viable remedy, which indicates that a section 4ll(a) dismissal in
Altai would not necessarily have been immediately followed by C./l:s refiling of a new suit.
The Altai Court presents a very seductive rationale for its liberal
construction of CA's proffered registration. Its rationale takes into
account the practical circumstances of an employer-author who creates
numerous versions of a computer program: "[C]omplete copyright
protection for a complicated program developed by the same author over
a period of time would require dozens if not hundreds of registrations."79 I will assume this is true. Here is my rejoinder.
I will start with the general proposition that copyright claims should
be interpreted narrowly by the courts for section 4ll(a) purposes. I
believe that applications for copyright registration, at least for commer-

76.

Altai, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.

11. Id.
78. Attorney fees awards are often much greater than statutory damages awards.
79. Altai, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)' at 1648; see also, Williams Products, Inc. v.
Construction Gaskets, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 622 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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cially important works, should be drafted with substantially more detail
than is generally the case now.
Generally speaking, a copyright is a government-backed monopoly
granted at the expense of the public and future creators in the hope that
promise of this legally enforceable monopoly will encourage creative
endeavors. However, the author should not get a monopol~hat is, the
right to exclude others from copying her work-for more than she
created. Further, future authors should be able to draw upon the first
creator's protected work to produce subsequent creations. The ability to
do that is severely hampered if the copyright claim is poorly defined,
such that subsequent authors are unable to discern what is protected and
what is not.80 This is simply a notice problem, and it can be solved
with a precisely drafted claim.
More specifically, the copyright registration is not only granted ex
parte (like a patent) but the whole registration process is primarily based
on the honor system: "[U]nlike a patent claim, a claim to copyright is
not examined for basic validity before a certificate is issued."81 "A
copyright certificate will be issued through a registration procedure in
which the validity of the copyright is not examined."82
It is undisputed that the Copyright Office bas neither the facilities nor the
authority to rule upon the factual basis of applications for registration or

renewal, and that where an application is fair upon its face, the Office cannot
refuse to perfonn the ''ministerial duty" of registration imposed upon [it] by the

law.83

"There is no such [patent-type] search or examination when a copyright
is secured. It issues almost automatically and there is no prior art to
contend with." 84
There is virtually no check on the breadth of the applicant's claim.
Yet when the applicant proffers this same piece of paper to a court
during an infringement suit, she is generously given a prima facie
presumption that both the copyright and all the facts stated in the

80. Indeed, several commentators have noted both the potential for this type of
abuse of the registration system, and that such abuse frequently occurs. See, e.g., Philip
Abromats, Nondisclosure of Preexisting Works in Software Copyright Registrations:
Inequitable Conduct in Need of a Remedy, 32 JURJMETRICS J. 571 (1992).
81. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 143 (D.N.J.
1982) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 157 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5773).
82. Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 765 n.1 (8th Cir. l973)(citing
17 U.S.C. § 1).
83. Cadence Indus. Corp. v. Ringer, 450 F. Supp. 59, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting
in part Bouve v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 122 F.2d 51 (1941)).
84. Stein v. Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 364,366 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
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certificate are valid. 85 The only viable incentive to compel the applicant to accurately recite the facts in the copyright application is to deny
enforcement based on section 41l(a) if she attempts to sue for infringement of a work that is not claimed in the certificate of registration.
The preparation of numerous applications for commercially important
works to cover copyright in each new incremental improvement is not
such an unfair burden. A registration certificate is extraordinarily simple
to complete, taking no more than an hour for an entirely new work of
authorship. The application for a derivative work based on a preexisting
work owned by the same author may only take fifteen minutes. Hence
"dozens if not hundreds"86 of registrations would still take less time
and expense than a single patent application. Therefore, an applicant's
preparation of numerous copyright applications should just be considered
an ordinary business expense. Moreover, immediately new versions of
a software program, prior to release, are probably protected by trade
secret, which means that they need not be registered until they are
publicly released and lose their trade secret status. Moreover, though
additional applications can be prepared at very low cost, the current
system of supplemental registration to amend original certificates further
reduces the cost of continuous protection.87 Finally, the Copyright
Office permits registration of a number of works ("group registration'')
with a single application form under some circumstances.88
My final reproach of the Altai holding is that it creates a rule
virtually without restraint. Jefferson Airplane v. Berkley Systems Inc. 89
presents another view. In Jefferson Airplane, the defendant moved to
dismiss the copyright infringement suit on section 41l(a) grounds
because plaintiff, Jefferson Airplane, alleged infringement of the artwork
85. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1996). Courts have in some cases refused to apply the
presumption of validity when the copyright registration is deemed too vague to properly
identify the material covered by the copyright See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905,908 (2d Cir. 1980); Fonar Corp. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc.,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 137
F.R.D. 372,386 (D. Utah 1991). These cases should not mislead the reader: My strong
impression is that courts give the copyright plaintiff every benefit of the doubt with
regard to registration practice.
86. Computer Assocs. Int'! Inc. v. Altai Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1648
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); see supra text accompanying note 79.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 408(d) (1996) and regulations promulgated under authority of this
provision at 37 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1996).
88. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)-(8) (1996).
89. 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1632 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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on an album cover even though it had registered only the sound
recording (using Form SR).90 The court quite correctly dismissed the
suit.91 Still, Jefferson Airplane appeared to own the copyright in the
cover artwork and it had apparently deposited a copy of the album cover
with the Copyright Office contemporaneous with its registration of the
sound recording. If Altai had been binding precedent on the Jefferson
Airplane Court, the case would not have been dismissed.92
Morita v. Omni Publications Int'!, Ltd. 93 is another example which
demonstrates the unworkable nature of the Altai rule. Morita is a
fascinating case in which an artist crafted a glass sculpture of a dove that
was subsequently broken into four pieces and displayed with glass shards
to give the appearance of being shattered in flight. 94 Next, numerous
photographs ohhis sculpture were taken, and one of these photographs
was selected for incorporation into a poster. 95 The poster, the actual
commercial embodiment of these individual artistic efforts, was
comprised of one of the reproduced photographs, a textual caption and
a red spot of blood.96 The suit for infringement arose when the
photographer authorized a magazine to publish an "out-take" photograph
of the dove sculpture.97 The owner of the copyright in the poster then
sued the photographer and the magazine.98 The plaintiff had registered
a claim specifying the poster but not the sculpture nor the photographs.
The court held that plaintiff's claim (specifying the poster) did not
subsume the copyrights in the sculpture.99 The court gave several
alternative reasons for its decision, but I want to focus here on one in
particular. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to state in section
6(b) that the poster was a derivative work. 100 In fact, he completed
6(b) with "not applicable," suggesting that this work was wholly
original. What the opinion does not say is what the plaintiff-registrant

90. Id.
91. Id. at 1635.
92. Actually, very explicit regulations promulgated under the Copyright Code and
contained in "Practices of the Examining Division in the Registration of Sound
Recordings (Class N)" resolve the issue in Jefferson Airplane: "Registration in Class N
cannot extend protection to a copyrightable matter appearing on a jacket, liner notes .
. • ." Jefferson Airplane, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634. However, I present Jefferson
Airplane merely to show the type of scenario for which the Altai rule gives an absurd

and unfair result.
93. 741 F. Supp. I 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
94. Id. at 1109.
95. Id. at 1!09-IO.
96. Id. at 11 IO.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100.
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recited in section 2(b), "Nature of Authorship." If section 2(b) was
completed with: "Arrangement of photograph of sculpture, textual
caption, etc. onto a poster," then the result is probably correct.
However, what if 2(b) instead read: "Sculpture, photograph of sculpture,
text, etc. and arrangement of these elements onto a poster?" If this was
how the certificate actually read, the result is perhaps wrong. This
constitutes the entire analysis under the approach that I present in this
Article. Under the Altai test, the court would be thrust into a timeconsuming ownership inquiry to determine whether the plaintiff owned
the copyright in the photograph and sculpture.
Still, my impression from reviewing the case law on this issue is that
many courts do indeed solve this problem correctly. For instance, in
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 101 Grumman,
the defendant, complained that although it may have copied the object
code (the source code after it has been transformel}-"compiled"--bythe
computer into machine language), it did not copy the source code (the
computer program in the form written by the programmer), and since the
latter was the thing registered, a section 411(a) dismissal was appropriate.102 The court summarily rejected this contention: "It is the work
that cannot be copied or incorporated and not the specific tangible
expression on file in the Copyright Office."103 This is precisely
correct. Interestingly, the Data General Court's result was reinforced by
the Copyright Office regulations set forth in the Compendium of
Copyright Office Practices, which states that the source code and object
code are just "two representations of the same computer program." 104
It further expains "[t]he claim is in the computer program rather than in
any particular representation of the program."105
D.

Scenario: Plaintiff Registers a "Compilation, " or "Collective
Work, " and the Infringer Then Copies a Constituent Element

Before I begin the discussion under this section, I shall introduce some
necessary terminology. The term "compilation" is defined in section 101

JOI. 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass 1993).
102. Id. at 1491-92.
103. Id. at 1492 (citing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'!, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1152,
1158 (N.D. Ill. 1981)).
104. COPYRIGIIT OFFICE, supra note 74, § 321.03.
105. Id. (emphasis in original).
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of the Code as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship. The term 'compilation' includes collective
works." 106 "Collective work" is also defined in the Act: "A 'collective work' is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective
whole." 107
Although not entirely evident from these definitions, a compilation and
a collective work are drastically different, even though the latter is
purported to be a species of the former. A compilation is a special kind
of work that is protectable even though it is comprised entirely of
preexisting, perhaps even unprotectable material. A good example is a
database of physicians in a particular city. Though the underlying
information is entirely factual, hence unprotectable, the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of that information is copyrightable.
Indeed, registering a work as a compilation may be even more valuable
than registering the underlying information. For instance, imagine a
database comprised of the names, phone numbers, hospital affiliations,
specialties, and educational credentials of every doctor in Los Angeles,
elaborately cross-referenced so that a user can obtain a list of physicians
according to any of dozens of parameters. A database of this sort,
provided it were original, would be registerable as a compilation. Now,
suppose a copier were to create an identical database except that it
contained physicians in New York. The latter database would infringe
the copyright in the former even though not one single word in the New
York database was borrowed from the original Los Angeles database.
This is true because the protectable elements are not the underlying data
but the unique selection, coordination and arrangement of the data.
Examples of compilations include telephone directories, 108
maps, 109 factual narratives,"" and financial data with summary and
analysis. lll The common feature of all of these is that the original

106. 17 U.S.C. § IOI (1996).
107. Id.
108. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Feist,
the particular telephone directory was held not to be protectable as a compilation, though
many are indeed protectable. See id. at 363.
109. See, e.g., Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Servs. Co., 768 F.2d 145
(7th Cir. 1985) (and cases cited therein).
I IO. See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990) (and cases cited
therein).
11 I. Wainright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977).

368

(VOL. 34: 343, 1997]

Section 411 of the Copyright Code
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

feature resides in the unique selection, coordination, and arrangement of
the constituent elements. The individual elements need not be, and
indeed often are not, independently protectable.
By contrast, a collective work is simply an administrative expedient
that permits an applicant for copyright registration to simultaneously
register a related roup of works under a single title using a single
application form. 11 For instance, in Szabo v. Errisson,113 the Fifth
Circuit held that a single copyright registration for a collection of songs
titled, "Scott Szabo's Songs of 1991" is sufficient to satisfy section
4ll(a) and allow the registrant to bring suit alleging copying of a single
song within the collection.114
How does one register a collection versus a compilation? An
application is required to complete section 6(b) if the work sought to be
registered is a compilation. In fact, a certificate of registration for a
compilation is readily distinguished from one for a "wholly original"
work by examination of "space 6" on Form TX.m In Form TX the
applicant is asked to complete space 6(b) by describing "[b]oth the
compilation itself and the material that has been compiled."116 This
section also permits the applicant to list any new matter added to the
preexisting materials. For instance, in my anthology example, an
applicant might recite the following in 6(b): "Compilation of edited
short stories with original notes provided at the end of each selection."
Moreover, in section 2(b) of the application, ''Nature of Authorship," the
applicant is required to "[g]ive a brief general statement of the nature of
this particular author's contribution to the work."' 17 Thus, the applicant might state: ''Unique selection, coordination, edition, and arrangement of the short works of American fiction writers, and authorship of
scholarly notes accompanying each selection." If the applicant
completed the application form this way, I am quite certain that she
could sue for infringement of the notes alone by proffering this
112. The requirements for registering a collection of unpublished works using a
single registration form are set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(3)(i)(B) (1996).
113. 68 F.3d 940 (5th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 944.
115. In each of the four major types of certificate of registration forms, "space 6"
is the location where the applicant would recite that the work sought to be registered is
a compilation. It is also where the applicant would describe precisely what she seeks
to register.
I I 6. Copyright Office, Instructions for Filling Out Application Form TX
117. Id.
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registration. The Copyright Office does not require an applicant to
register each element of the claim separately. Thus, a compilation and
any new matter subsumed under the compilation may be claimed in a
single registration. The general policy is "one registration per
work," 118 but since the two elements exist in the same work (the
anthology), a single registration will suffice. The Office does require
that the application for registration clearly set forth the applicant's claim,
in the case of a compilation or collection, particularly by correctly
completing sections 2(b) and 6(b).
A collective work is registered in virtually the same way. The
applicant is only required to use the term "compilation" in section 6(b),
unless the applicant's collection is in fact selected, coordinated, or
arranged such that it constitutes an original work of authorship. The
Copyright Office instructions accompanying Form TX request that the
applicant state in section 2(b) that the work is a collective work. 119
The applicant should then particularly identify those elements of the
collection for which the applicant is the author. Next, section 103(b)
states that the scope of protection for a compilation "[e]xtends only to
the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed in the work." 120 One more
factual detail needs to be recited.
There is a surprising paucity of case law concerning whether a
registration of a compilation will satisfy section 411(a) in the case of a
plaintiff who sues for infringement of a constituent element. Perhaps
this is because such a case would rarely be brought. For instance, many
compilations are collections of pure facts (such as a directory of the
names, phone numbers, and educational background of all intellectual
property lawyers in Dallas, Texas). The constituent elements in this type
of compilation are unprotectable. 121 Hence, the copyright owner would
never sue one who copied some of the elements without copying the
protected features of the compilation. However, many types of
compilations contain elements that are protectable. For instance, an
anthology of fiction which contains notes discussing each selection is
protectable. Therefore, the editor of the anthology is also an author of
an original work, consisting of the notes following each piece of fiction.
Suppose someone incorporated one of the novellas from the anthology
and some of the notes accompanying that piece written by the editor into
her own anthology. Obviously, the copyist has not copied the compila118.
119.
120.
121.
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37 C.F.R. § 202.3(a)(9) (1996).
Copyright Office, l1111tructionsfor Filling Out Application Form TX.
17 u.s.c. § 103(b) (1996).
See 17 U.S.C. 102(b) (1996).
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tion aspect since she only took one piece and the accompanying notes
to that piece. Nor has she prepared a derivative work of the compilation, which would constitute a separate act of infringement in addition
to copying. 122 On the other hand, the notes do constitute an original
work of authorship created by the owner of the copyright in the
compilation. It seems quite unfair to dismiss the infringement action on
the technical ground that the plaintiff did not also separately register the
individual elements that he authored, using a registration form separate
from the one used to register the compilation. Or does it?
My review of the case law on this question reveals that courts virtually
always permit a plaintiff to maintain a suit for copyright infringement of
a constituent element even though the plaintiff has proffered only a
registration certificate for the compilation, provided that the copied
element is protectable and that the copyright is owned by the plaintiff.
Howard v. Sterchi 123 is a suitable example to begin my discussion
of the case law. The plaintiff, Howard, authored a log home plan book
which was duly registered with the Copyright Office as a compilation.124 The book is comprised of drawings of preexisting floor plans
for log homes. 125 Howard reworked some of these drawings. 126
Defendant Sterchi copied some of the floor plans, but Howard did not
allege that Sterchi infringed the copyright in the compilation-----that is, the
organizational contribution. She argued instead that copyright in the
compilation protects the floor plans as well. Predictably, Sterchi sought
dismissal of the suit for failure to comply with section 4ll(a). The court
held that the registration of the compilation subsumed the components
and refused to dismiss under section 411 (a). 127 Was this result
correct? That depends on the scope of Howard's claim as set forth in
the registration. Unfortunately, this information is not available from the
text of the Howard opinion. The opinion does not explain precisely how
the applicant completed sections 2(b) or 6(b) of the application. If she
specifically claimed the new matter by describing it in either section,
then the case was correctly decided; otherwise, it was not. If Howard
described the work as a collective work, that would be sufficient to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

17 u.s.c. § 106(2) (1996).
725 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
Id. at 1574.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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secure registration for the individual drawings. Similarly, if Howard
described the work as a compilation and, in either section 2(b) or 6(b),
she described the new material added (here, an original contribution to
the individual drawings), that would also suffice to register the drawings.
However, if Howard simply registered the work as a compilation and
failed to describe any original contribution (other than the selection,
coordination, and arrangement) then any new material was left unclaimed. If this was the case, then Howard was wrongly decided. 128
Educational Testing Services v. Katzman illustrates this distinction. 129 There, plaintiff registered "Achievement Tests" as compilations of individual questions. 130 Defendant copied some of the questions, but not all of them. 131 When plaintiff sued for infringement,
defendant moved to dismiss on section 41l(a) grounds, arguing that the
registrations covered only the compilation and not the individual
questions. 132 Toe Third Circuit disagreed. 133 Although plaintiff had
registered the entire test as a compilation, it also specifically claimed
authorship of the questions as well by stating that it was the author of
the "entire text." 134 This case is correctly decided.
Similarly, in Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 135 plaintiff sued
defendant for preparing a derivative work of a single illustration
contained in a book of illustrations that Woods had previously registered
as a compilation. 136 Just like ETS, the Woods Court held that the
plaintiff traversed the section 411 (a) requirement by stating clearly in the
registration that the applicant (Woods) was the author of each illustration
contained in the book. 137 Hence, the individual illustrations were made
part of the copyright claim.
In Dahinden v. Byrne et al., the plaintiff had registered, apparently
either as a compilation or collective work, a book titled "Sasquatch."138
"Sasquatch" contained two Russian reports prepared by Russian
128. Note also that§ 103(b) does not compel this result Section 103(b) states, in
pertinent part, only that: "The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material conatbuted by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work ••.•" 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1996) (emphasis
added). Still, that does not mean that the copyright in the compilation extends to all
material contributed by the author.
129. 793 F. Supp. 533 (3d Cir. 1986).
130. Id. at 538.
131. Id. at 535.
132. Id. at 537.
133. Id. at 538-39.
134. Id. at 539. This statement was probably made in § 2(b).
135. 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1790 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1792.
138. Dahinden v. Byrne et al., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 317,318 (D. Or. 1982).
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researchers and summarized analyses of motion picture footage of what
appears to be a sasquatch-like creatureP9 Defendant authored a book
that also incorporated the Russian reports. 140 The court dismissed the
infringement action on the ground that the plaintiff was not the author
of the Russian reports, but only of the compilation as a whole. 141
Although the courts fixate solely on authorship/ownership of the
underlying elements, the inquiry should not end there. What is
important for section 411(a) purposes is not just that the applicant was
the author of the individual drawings, songs, questions, or illustrations,
but that she explicitly claimed these elements by asserting authorship in
the registration form.
Section 410(c) gives a copyright plaintiff who proffers a valid
registration certificate, made before or within five years after first
publication, a prima facie presumption of both the copyright's validity
and the validity of all the facts stated in the certificate. 142 With section
410(c) in mind, it seems senseless to give a plaintiff the benefit of these
generous presumptions unless she has actually claimed the subject matter
alleged to have been copied by the defendant. Without claiming the
particular subject matter copied, the defendant must rebut unearned
presumptions-unearned because the Copyright Office was deprived of
the opportunity to assess ownership (copyrightability and originality) of
the underlying subject matter. Therefore, I conclude that the Dahinden
Court achieved the correct result by applying the incorrect analysis. All
the court had to do-and this is a far simpler inquiry-was to determine
whether the plaintiff had claimed authorship of the Russian reports in its
registration. If it did, then that gives rise to a prima facie presumption
of ownership which would allow the court to stop right there if the
defendant proffered no evidence in rebuttal. If it did not, then the court
should dismiss the suit under section 4ll(a). All the cases I have
reviewed hold that constituent elements of a compilation are implicitly
registered the moment the compilation is registered, provided the
registrant is the author, and therefore the owner of the copyright, in the
new material. The language in these holdings is directed toward
protectability. Note that all the cases I present in this Article involve a

139.
140.

141.
142.

Id. at 318.
Id.
Id. at 319.

17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1996).
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motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, specifically for
failure to comply with section 411(a). Hence the issue is-or at least
should be-jurisdictional. These disputes are about enforceability and not
protectability. Put more simply, the courts in these cases see the
question as whether the new material contributed by the author is
protectable. Once they decide it is, they then see no reason why it
should be denied enforceability.
I see this analysis as fundamentally incorrect. Again, the issue is
enforceability and not protectability. The new material contributed by
the author of the compilation may be copyrightable as an original work
of authorship, but that is irrelevant. Section 411(a) states that a
copyright plaintiff must register her claim before brin§ing suit for
infringement of a work subsumed under that claim. 14 It is not
concerned with protectability. Indeed, a bedrock principle of copyright
law is that copyright protection is independent of registration. 144
Instead, the purpose behind section 4ll{a) is to streamline copyright
infringement litigation by simplifying the ownership issue, which is the
first prong in a prima facie case of copyright infringement.
The confluence of sections 410(c), 4Il(a), and 412 create a powerful
incentive to timely register copyright claims. Judicial resolution of
copyright ownership ex post only dilutes those incentives. The purpose
of sections 410(c), 411(a), and 412 is to prevent a court from having to
conduct an exhaustive fact-finding excursion to determine ownership of
the particular constituent elements. Section 411(a), backed by the
incentives provided by sections 410(c) and 412, requires that the
registrant distinctly set forth her claim to facilitate resolution of the
ownership issue. If a registrant claims only a compilation and desires
to sue for infringement of a constituent part, the court should dismiss
with prejudice under section 411(a), rather than determine ab initio
protectability and ownership of the element. Upon dismissal, the
registrant can simply register the new material and file suit again, this
time forfeiting the benefits of section 412.
Yet the courts to which I am directing this polemic may reply that the
certificate of registration for the compilation does in fact serve as a valid
registration for all new material contributed by the author-claimant. I do
not think this is correct. It is true that the plaintiff completed a
certificate of registration claiming copyright in a compilation, as
evidenced by the information she provided in section 6 of the registration form. It is also true that within the compilation are constituent

143.
144.
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elements that the plaintiff authored in addition to the compilation. So
why not allow the plaintiff to enforce the copyright in the new material
by proffering a registration certificate for the compilation? There are
several reasons.
First, notice is at the heart of any legal requirement that a property
owner publicize her claim in her property. In this instance, the copyright
claim as set forth in the certificate of registration is the sole means
available to a subsequent user to determine the proper scope of the
copyright. If the registrant does not "claim" the new material by stating
in section 2(b) that the claimed work is a compilation and that it also
includes wholly original material authored by the claimant, but rather
just classifies the work as a compilation by completing section 6, then
why should she later be permitted to reclaim original material apart from
the compilation? The copyright laws exist both to protect an author's
work and to permit her regulated access to the work of others. The
latter goal fails if copyright claims are uncertain. A creator should be
able to freely copy unclaimed elements from another's work. Moreover,
my view is strictly consistent with the Code; Section 103(b) states that
"[t]the copyright in such work [derivative work or compilation] is
independent of . .. any copyright protection in the preexisting material."14s

Further, though an application for copyright is not examined to the
extent of a patent application, there is still some proforma examination
performed on each application received by the Copyright Office. Indeed,
for compilations the examination is apparently far more rigorous than for
wholly original material. 146 A copyright examiner can read the
application form and assess whether the applicant claims copyrightable
subject matter, and whether the claim traverses the very minimal
threshold of originality. The examiner does this by reviewing the
application. In the case of a compilation, the examiner assesses the
claim from a very specific point of view: Is the particular selection,
coordination, and arrangement of the material contained in the compilation proper subject matter? For instance, the examiner may scrutinize

145. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
146. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also
Marybeth Peters, The Copyright Office and the Formal Requirements ofRegistration of
Claims To Copyright, 17 U. DAYTON L. R.Ev. 737 (1992); Steven Metalitz, Copyright
Protection After Feist: New Rules and New Roles? 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 763 (1992).
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the claim to determine whether the applicant is trying to claim an idea
or concept of arranging information rather than a fixed work. In
addition, the examiner will ask whether the compilation is an original
work of authorship or is merely an exhaustive listing. What the
examiner will not do is ask these two questions for each constituent
element contained in the compilation. Depending on the claimant's
response to sections 2(b) and 6(b), the examiner knows whether the
applicant has claimed copyright in any of the underlying material.
Thus, assume that the defendant who is charged with infringement of
an underlying element of the compilation moves to dismiss the
infringement suit on authority of section 4ll(a), since the plaintiff's
proffered registration only covers the compilation, not the constituent
elements. The defendant argues that section 4ll(a) was drafted to
promote resolution of copyright infringement suits by preventing the
court from having to decide ab initio, ownership of the copyright.
Defendant further argues that the presumption of ownership granted by
section 410(c) (indeed of all facts recited in the certificate of registration) arises because the certificate has been examined by the Copyright
Office, which determined that the claim possessed copyrightable subject
matter and was an original work of authorship entitled to copyright. The
defendant then argues that applying the presumption in this particular
case is pointless and unfair since there was no opportunity to pass on the
protectability and originality of the element for which the plaintiff
alleges infringement. That is, the rational basis for the presumption is
that the court need not do what the Copyright Office has already done.
However, the Copyright Office has not determined copyrightability in
the element sued upon. The Office passed upon only those elements
specifically claimed by completion of the registration form. Thus, the
court must determine ownership (protectability and originality) on its
own. Hence, the very procedure that section 411 (a) was drafted to
encourage was not followed. Therefore, why should plaintiff be
permitted to ward off a motion to dismiss by relying on a Code
provision whose purpose she ignored?
A second reason why courts should rely more strictly on the registration certificate when deciding motions to dismiss under section 411(a)
is that section 411(a), backed by the incentives of early registration
provided in section 412, is the best means to police proper registration
practice. 147 The applicant's failure to properly claim all the copyrightable elements to which she is entitled should not result in forfeiture of
copyright in those elements. Indeed, section 408(a) is quite direct on

147.
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this P.oint: Ownership of copyright does not depend on its registration. 48 Likewise, outright unenforceability of the entire claim is
probably too harsh. Yet applicants must be compelled to properly set
forth their copyright claims. They should not be allowed to claim more
than they created. The proper incentive is provided for in sections
4ll(a) and 412. Section 4ll(a) requires a valid registration certificate
covering the work sued upon. But if the plaintiff-registrant did not
explicitly claim the copyrighted elements infringed by defendant, then
dismissal without prejudice is proper according to section 4ll(a).
Though the plaintiff may quickly register the infringed elements and
immediately refile suit, the dismissal has more than technical significance. Section 412 forbids a copyright plaintiff to recover statutory
damages and attorney fees for any infringement that occurred prior to
registration (unless registered within three months of publication).149
For many copyright plaintiffs, the initial section 4ll(a) dismissal will be
fatal because they filed suit relying on statutory damages, unable to
prove actual damages for one reason or another. Nor is the section
4ll(a) dismissal too severe-the plaintiff has only been denied the
availability of statutorily created remedies and must face the expense of
refiling suit. Therefore, sections 4ll(a) and 412 provide the proper
incentives to the putative copyright plaintiff but only if section 411 (a) is
used properly to dispose of claims for infringement of accused articles
that do not embody any protectable elements specifically claimed in the
plaintiff's registration certificate.
Now I want to return to why copyright law needs a sharp incentive to
compel strict compliance with the regulations prescribing registration of
copyright claims. The most obvious reason is proper notice. That a
copyright plaintiff who proffers a valid copyright registration is entitled
to a presumption of validity of his copyright and of all the facts
contained in the certificate, is another reason. These presumptions
should be earned.
Obviously, my rule will force copyright owners to file more registrations. Indeed, at least one court has interpreted a copyright registration
certificate very broadly for section 4ll(a) purposes (too broadly I would
argue), largely on the ground that a contrary rule would compel a
copyright owner to continuously register each small iteration to her
148.
149.

17 u.s.c. § 408(a) (1996).
17 u.s.c. § 412 (1996).
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initial work. I have already addressed this: Continuous registration of
incremental improvements can be done at very low cost. 150 Moreover,
the more detail provided in registration certificates, the better the notice
to a subsequent user of the bounds of the copyright owner's claim. The
additional detail has a cost, but so does less detail, and the author bears
both costs. What I mean is that authors want both maximum protection
(at lowest cost) and maximum access to works which have already been
copyrighted. 151 These two interests conflict with one another. Although the standard I propose will cause the author to incur higher
registration costs, she will ultimately benefit because she will have
superior notice of the protected status of preexisting works upon which
her work is based.
In summary, courts are deciding section 4ll(a) questions based on
protectability of the material and ownership of its copyright. This is
incorrect; section 4ll(a) is an enforceability provision designed to
streamline copyright litigation by inducing a plaintiff to register his
claim which then serves as prima facie evidence of ownership of the
copyright. Section 4ll(a) must therefore require a court to dispose of
infringement suits in which the plaintiff has not clearly claimed
ownership by a valid certificate of registration of the copyrighted
material at issue.
E.

Scenario: Plaintiff's Registration Contains Technical Errors

My proposed model is tempered by the venerable principle of
copyright law which states that technical defects in the registration
certificate will generally not bar enforceability of the copyright unless
the error was committed intentionally and might have caused the
copyright office to reject the application. 152 I am concerned that courts
may rely on this rule to unfairly expand the scope of the plaintiff's
copyright to cover material that he may have authored but that he did
not claim. If so, this would severely frustrate application of the
approach that I present in this Article.

150. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
151. For a more comprehensive discussion of this principle, see William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL Sruo. 325
(1989).
152. See, e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 861 (2d Cir. 1984);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Lofts, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 827 {I Ith Cir.
1982); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481,
1494 (D. Mass. 1993); Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc., 646 F.
Supp. 1329, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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There are two types of errors that may occur in a registration
application: (1) Mere clerical/technical errors and (2) errors that
impermissibly expand the scope of the copyright. In other words, a
"technical error" is one that does not affect the scope of the copyright.
Such things as incorrectly listing the work's title or date of publication,
omission of an author, misspellings, etc., are all technical errors. 153
Errors occurring in sections 2(b), 6(a), and 6(b) of the registration
application, however, deserve a closer look.
Misstatements or omissions in sections 2(b), 6(a), and 6(b) are the
most significant substantive errors that a registrant can commit. Failure
to properly list the underlying works prevents the examiner from
deciding originality, and therefore registrability of the copyright claim.
Moreover, section 6(a) contains by far the most important question on
the entire registration application for compilations and derivative works.
This is because the applicant's response to 6(a) actually defines the
scope of her copyright. If her response is "NIA," then subsequent
authors understand the registration to protect the entire work; if she lists
underlying works, then a subsequent author can then deduce the
copyrightable elements of the new work-i.e., the scope of the copyright
claim. Further, the words "might have caused the copyright office to
reject the application," 154 are unduly deferential to the registrant. I
don't believe the "materiality" of the error should be defined by whether
or not that registration would have been denied but for the omission.
Instead the test should be whether the scope of the registration would
have been different. For instance, if a putative registrant submitted an
anthology for registration but failed to complete line 6(a) or penned
"NIA," then a subsequent author who sees the copyright notice on the
volume and obtains the registration would quite naturally believe that the
registration covers the entire work rather than just the compilation
(unique selection, coordination, and arrangement only). In fact, the
registration as it stands does cover the entire work, but if the registrant
had disclosed the underlying works (i.e., the individual elements making
up the anthology) then the registration would have covered the
compilation aspects only. This line of argument also demonstrates the
inadequacy of the deposit copy, without more, defining the bounds of
153. See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493; Ricci et al. v.
Gemcraft Ltd. et al., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 587.
154. Dynamic Solutions Inc., 646 F. Supp. at 1341.
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the claim. A subsequent author who desires to draw from a copyrighted
work can no more tell what is protected by examination of the deposit
copy than one can determine the recipe for a cake by eating it.
Furthermore, my test is consonant with the materiality standard in patent
law, although there the argument is clearer since a patent has discrete
claims, whereas a copyright registration is hopelessly vague as to what
is claimed. In patent law, the materiality inquiry would never be stated:
"Would the patent have issued?" Instead, the question would be "How
would a specific claim be different?" 155
I began this section by stating that the court-at the urging of the
copyright plaintiff-may use the "technical error rule" as a safe harbor
of sorts to impermissibly expand the scope of the copyright registration.
This is a testable hypothesis. Though I was unable to locate any cases
to verify my hypothesis, I did locate several cases involving errors that
the court termed "clerical," though they may have affected the scope of
the copyright. 156

N. CONCLUSION
The correct result in section 411 cases generally requires the correct
analysis. The correct analysis in turn requires a correct understanding
of the crucial terms "claim," "work," and "copy." A work js a generic
term for a related set of expressions, both protectable and unprotectable.
The subset of protectable expressions comprise the "claim." Finally, a
"copy'' is one of many particular physical forms in which a work may
be embodied.
Second, section 4Il(a), far from being a trivial jurisdictional
requirement, should be used by courts to compel proper registration
procedure. Indeed, copyright law desperately needs such an incentive
since copyright claims are registered virtually without substantive
examination. Yet section 410(c) gives a copyright plaintiff the benefit
of a presumption of validity of all facts contained in the certificate of
registration. I believe that without a sharp incentive to compel carefully
prepared registration certificates, these presumptions will be remitted to
the copyright plaintiff unearned. Critics of this view will likely argue
that registration certificates should be more liberally interpreted since
continuous registration of every incremental improvement to a work is
too costly. I argued in this Article that it is not.

155. See, e.g., A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
156. Data Gen. Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481; Dynamic Solutions Inc., 646 F.
Supp. 1329.
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